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In an attempt to adapt traditional Confucianism to a modern democratic-constitution-
al society while embracing value pluralism, Sungmoon Kim defends and constructs 
public reason Confucianism as a plausible model of Confucian democratic perfection-
ism in East Asia’s pluralist context. Kim’s book is generally addressed to those who are 
working on Confucian political philosophy, those who are interested in liberalism, 
modern democracy and value pluralism, and those who are interested in East Asian 
politics. In the background of reconstructing Confucian political philosophy while 
confronting the challenge of value pluralism, three major kinds of Confucian perfec-
tionism have existed including Confucian democracy (David L. Hall, Roger T. Ames) 
Confucian political meritocracy (Daniel A. Bell), and a possible hybrid version of the 
above two, Confucian meritocratic perfectionism (Ruiping Fan, Jiang Qing, Joseph 
Chan, Tongdong Bai). As a partially comprehensive perfectionism, Kim’s public reason 
Confucianism, prescribing a modern and practical proposal that synthesizes both Con-
fucian values and democracy as its normative ground, is an outstanding reconstruction 
of modern Confucian political theory, and I admire the book’s exceptionally detailed 
arguments and a significant contribution to the discourse of reconciling Confucian 
traditions, modern democracy, and value pluralism.  
Chapter 1 lays out the sketch of public reason Confucianism as a partially comprehen-
sive perfectionism, instead of political perfectionism, comprehensive antiperfectionism 
or political antiperfectionism. For a Confucian polity, Kim argues that it must be com-
prehensive Confucian perfectionism, since it is impossible for the Confucian state not 
to be committed to promoting the Confucian values of the good life. While both reject 
political meritocracy, Joseph Chan’s moderate political Confucian perfectionism differs 
largely from Kim’s model in the question of whether a comprehensive doctrine, specifi-
cally the Confucian collective way of the good life, is compatible with value pluralism. 
Under the assumption of an incompatibility between comprehensive Confucianism 
and modern pluralism, Chan proposes that Confucian perfectionism must be non-
comprehensive but political, which entails a list of civilities. However, Kim responds 
that Chan’s civility consideration (46-52) is more akin to John Rawls’s “liberal neutral-
ity,” undermining its normative ground as a Confucian theory. Instead, Kim proposes 
a type of moderate, comprehensive Confucian perfectionism supplemented with “the 
intelligibility condition” (45), which makes Kim’s Confucian perfectionism potentially 
compatible with pluralism or even with civility. Under these conditions, Confucian 
perfectionism must be moderate, with an acknowledgment of the plurality of moral 
values and the results of moral disagreement, and most importantly, the public recogni-
tion of “the intrinsic [rather than the instrumental] value of democracy,” such as popu-
lar sovereignty, political equality, and the right to political participation (27). In a sum, 
“[Confucian democratic perfectionism] justifies public promotion of Confucian cultural 
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values in the service of democratic citizenship under the normative constraints of core 
democratic principles” (68).
In chapter 2, to avoid possible tensions between Confucian perfectionism and value 
pluralism, Kim lists two normative premises and six propositions to elaborate public 
reason Confucianism, and argues that Confucian democratic perfectionism compared 
to John Rawls’s public reason liberalism is more suitable for the contemporary politics 
of many East Asian societies (71). Kim describes John Rawls’s political liberalism as 
moderate, since Rawls’s scope of public reason is only limited to “constitutional es-
sentials and matters of basic structure” (74). Such “limits of public reason” also mark 
Rawls’s political liberalism as a kind of political antiperfectionism (74-75). Further, 
Kim points out that Rawls’s non-Hobbesian conceptualization of public reason inevi-
tably leads to “the possibility of plural interpretations of public reason” as well as the 
possible “intertwinement” between public reason and perfectionist values (80-81), due 
to its promotion of “substantively” liberal values (86). With the recognition of a pos-
sible “overlap between public reason and comprehensive doctrines” (81), Kim suggests 
a kind of public reason Confucianism as a mode of public reason perfectionism, where 
Confucian “public reason” is defined as the “[shared] reason of [Confucian] democratic 
citizens” (98-101). 
Different from traditional, fully comprehensive Confucianism, Kim’s partially com-
prehensive Confucianism is a “democratic-constitutional normative” theory (171), 
with practical implications for the constitutional rights derived from the public reason 
of democratic citizens. In part II of the book, chapters 3 and 4 specifically discuss the 
constitutional implications of Kim’s public reason Confucianism, particularly the prac-
tical implications of the third proposition (P3) of public reason Confucianism, which 
states, “in a Confucian society, all citizens are equal to one another qua public citizens 
and together they exercise popular sovereignty” (88). Through the case of the abolition 
of the family-head system and the case of the traditional clan’s membership from the 
South Korean Supreme Court, Kim aims to show that “public reason Confucianism has 
an active political interest in ensuring that (nonsectarian) Confucian values as well as 
democratic-constitutional ideals endorsed by Confucian public reasoning are promot-
ed within civil society” (171). Take the example of a traditional clan’s membership that 
excludes women’s equal membership. Public reason Confucianism could be a norma-
tive guide to reconcile both traditional values of filial piety and the modern constitu-
tional right of gender equality. 
To argue that modern Confucian polity’s constitutional order depends upon the shared 
reason of democratic citizens (173) and a set of civic traits, say, “patriotism, a sense of 
justice, a sense of common fate, moral criticism, self-restraint, tolerance, and…active 
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political participation” (177), Kim explores the relationship between “moral virtue” 
and “civic virtue” in chapter 5. Scholars have been greatly interested in understanding 
whether any qualitative difference exists between civic virtue and moral virtue in clas-
sical Confucianism. With an endorsement of Confucian virtue monism, Joseph Chan 
justifies the preference for moral virtue over civic virtue in terms of “the motivation 
reason,” “the opportunity reason,” and “the assurance reason” (Chan, 2013, 94-100). 
According to Chan, one is more motivated, with more opportunity as well as assurance 
from others, to cultivate one’s moral virtues rather than civic virtues, and correspond-
ingly “moral education is more effective than a political version of civic education in 
engendering the virtues necessary for a well-functioning democracy” (Chan, 97). How-
ever, Kim points out that Chan cannot consistently take a monistic approach to virtue 
while insisting there be a sharp distinction between moral and civic virtues (179), 
which is used to solve the tension between comprehensive Confucian doctrines and 
value pluralism. In addition, Chan’s promotion of certain selective Confucian moral 
values, such as “respect, reverence, trustworthiness, sincerity, and beneficence without 
accepting the whole philosophy of Confucianism”(Chan, 100),  would either make 
his Confucian perfectionism too akin to liberal perfectionism but less to Confucian 
perfectionism, or would become impossible if the “wholistic structure of Confucian 
virtue ethics”(181) is assumed. In a sum, Kim claims that Chan mistakenly “identifies 
comprehensive doctrine solely in terms of a fully comprehensive doctrine” (182), while 
public reason Confucianism as a partially comprehensive doctrine, under the ground 
of “tempered virtue monism,” allows “room for civic virtue, distinct practically, if not 
conceptually, from moral virtue, which can bring citizens who are internally diverse 
as private individuals or members of associations into one political world under one 
consideration” (193-194).
Specifically, Kim emphasizes “the ethical continuum [and intertwinement] between 
moral virtue and civic virtue” (184) instead of a sharp distinction between these two 
by appealing to classical Confucian texts, such as the Daxue and the Shujing. As for the 
challenge of “how human/moral virtue can be extended to politics without transform-
ing into something qualitatively different, specifically tailored for public realm” (188), 
Kim introduces Mencius’s developmental and analogical reasoning on moral extension, 
and points to a possible political virtue for a political leader that can be discerned from 
Mencius’s account of Yi Yin (189-190). In addition, in the Story of Guan Zhong, Kim’s 
interpretation is that Confucius seems to praise a type of “political relevant virtue” for 
political agents in a nonideal situation, specifically regarding the notion of ren, which 
might relevantly contribute to a Confucian polity’s constitutional integrity (190-191). 
According to Kim, although there is the practical but not conceptual distinction, civic 
virtue is extended and justified from moral virtue, and its instrumental and practical 
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value lies in its promotion and “reproduction” of “the Confucian public character of 
the polity” (199). In Kim’s picture, some Confucian virtues, such as “filial piety, frater-
nal responsibility, respect for elders, harmony within the family, ancestor worship, and 
ritual propriety” (194) could be labelled as civic virtues as long as they practically and 
publicly contribute to a constitutional order and “common citizenship” (199). 
In chapter 6, Kim argues that the right to political participation is a necessary constitu-
ent to public reason Confucianism, granted by his public equality proposition (P3). 
Such a strong requirement on the right to political participation marks Kim’s proposal 
not only different from traditional, comprehensive Confucianism but also many con-
temporary Confucian political theories. For example, Daniel Bell’s Confucian meri-
tocracy demonstrates a preference for social participation over political participation 
(205-206), and Joseph Chan, being skeptical about political participation, supports 
“popular political participation” (205). To justify his view on Confucian political equal-
ity, Kim reinterprets, and reconstructs a type of Mencian political philosophy, which 
could disconnect sagehood and kingship along with the sense of democratization of 
the ideal of sagehood as well as “the universal accessibility of public office” (209). Kim 
firstly asserts that a Mencian view of moral equality from Mencius’s Xing-Shan thesis, 
which declares all human beings are equally born with the capability of cultivating 
moral sprouts and becoming moral sages, could entail a universal sense of individual 
dignity for all human beings (209-217). As for the contradiction between Mencius’s 
moral equality and “old aristocratic ideal of political inequality” (220), Kim suggests re-
constructing Mencian political philosophy directly derived from those moral assump-
tions of moral equality and human dignity, given the historical restrictions of Mencius’s 
political ritualism. Further, Kim asserts that the idea of “equal moral opportunity to 
become a public official” is able to “derive and justify seminal Mencian Confucian ideas 
of popular sovereignty and the right to political participation” (209).  Here, “popular 
sovereignty” granted by “the right to political participation” different from “popular 
participation,” is possibly compatible with “the qualified few taking action” (223-225) 
in public affairs. To further bridge “the people’s right to political participation and 
democratic representation,” Kim revisits Mencius 6A10, and reinforces the value of 
human dignity particularly in the context of value pluralism (227-230). Human dignity 
should include both material interests and ideal interests under Kim’s agreement with 
Max Weber (228-231), and correspondingly, the protection of both types of interests 
would require a Confucian democratic citizen to affirm Rawls’s duty of civility, which 
embraces a right to political participation (231). Then, prescribed by public reason 
Confucianism, political participation as a kind of civic virtue would uphold a certain 
version of democratic representation. Responding to the assurance problem that might 
be associated with civic virtue, Kim ascribes its new features, beyond John Locke’s 
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“inconveniences,” to value pluralism in an era of modern politics, which necessitates 
the right to political participation and the promotion of democratic citizenship. As Kim 
concludes, “the Confucian democracy justified by public reason Confucianism estab-
lishes the government for, of, and by the people” (240). 
It is impossible to dive deeply into all the insightful features of Kim’s Public Reason 
Confucianism: Democratic Perfectionism and Constitutionalism in East Asia in a brief 
book review. Instead, my central interest is to understand Kim’s public reason condi-
tion as a restriction to reconcile the tension between a type of Confucian perfectionism 
and value pluralism. I agree with Kim that it is impossible for democratic citizens to 
completely set aside deep justifications for controversial values while merely endorsing 
a freestanding and political doctrine of justice, and that some Confucian values might 
be able to offer an alternative beyond “liberal neutrality” to sustain a variety of compet-
ing comprehensive moral doctrines. Here are just a few questions to further explore 
the details of Kim’s public reason condition. What presumptions and Confucian values 
contribute to a type of shared reason known and accepted by the public in a modern 
Confucian society? What are the qualifications for Confucian democratic citizens? For 
example, would a person who refuses to take care of seniors while practically promot-
ing democratic deliberation and political participation qualify as a Confucian demo-
cratic citizen? Would the essentials of such Confucian shared reason and its specifi-
cations and implications be conceivable and possibly supported by non-Confucian 
proponents, say, Buddhist monks, who hold different moral, religious, and philosophi-
cal worldviews? Regarding the grounding values, Kim seems to more directly base 
his work on some thin notions of moral equality and human dignity rather than on 
some thick Confucian values, while insisting that the value of democracy is intrinsic. 
In Kim’s picture, some Confucian virtues, such as “filial piety, fraternal responsibility, 
respect for elders, harmony within the family, ancestor worship, and ritual propriety” 
(194) could be justified as civic virtues as long as they are practically and publically 
contributing to a constitutional order and “common citizenship” (199). For example, 
derived from the fully comprehensive notion of filial piety (X) or its pluralistic versions 
(X1, X2, X3…Xn) within particular Confucian communities, the civic filial piety (x) is 
partially comprehensive in the sense that its character is negotiated with the “democrat-
ic principles of individual dignity and gender equality” (201), and it contributes to “the 
public identity of … Confucian citizens” (201). Must Kim’s moderate, comprehensive 
Confucian perfectionism with the priority of the intrinsic value of democracy, grant 
the equal status of divergent comprehensive doctrines to effectively leave substantial 
content of public reason wide open to value pluralism? The notion of democracy, to a 
certain extent, contains some liberal assumptions of the representation and compro-
mise of conflicting private interests. Under those assumptions, Kim’s commitments to 
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the instrumental values of some Confucian virtues seem to undermine its normative 
grounds as a Confucian theory but appear more akin to a liberal model of democratic 
representation. Within a foundationally liberal framework, the limit of democracy 
in dealing with moral disagreement still remains. The distinctive strength of modern 
Confucian political theory in the context of moral conflicts, I feel, does not merely lie 
in whether some Confucian values could satisfy their instrumental values to contribute 
to a democratic-constitutional order, but probably should also be credited with its non-
polarized dimensions of a Confucian form of life, such as the Confucian doctrine of 
“Harmony in Diversity” (和而不同), which entails the coexistence of a variety of moral 
values. Some historical perspectives on cultural integrations and transformations in 
East Asia might affirm the value of “Harmony in Diversity.”
As for the project of modernizing traditional Confucianism, I also found Kim’s key 
reconstruction of Mencian political philosophy very illuminating, particularly his high-
lighting of the possible disconnect between Confucian sagehood and kingship. As Kim 
argues, “Mencius’s conscious refutation of the exclusive connection between sagehood 
and kingship not only enables what can be called the democratization of the ideal of sa-
ghood but, more importantly, the universal accessibility of public office to any virtuous 
person regardless of his social pedigree, engendering a new ideal of political equality” 
(209).  I agree with Kim that both Bo Yi and Yi Yin in Mencius were praised as good 
politicians who strategically practiced their political ideals and moral commitments 
without blindly obeying ancient kingship, but interestingly the Confucian sagehood 
was ranked higher than the above two. Mencius says, 
When one should take office, he would take office; when one should stop, he would 
stop; when one should take a long time, he would take a long time; when one should 
hurry, he would hurry. This was Kongzi. All were sages of ancient times. I have never 
been able to act like them, but my wish is to learn from Kongzi. (Mengzi, 2A2.22)
In these passages from Mencius, the Confucian governance appears to be a mixture 
of realism and idealism, which might affirm Kim’s public reason Confucianism as 
the middle path between Paul Weithman’s “perfectionist republicanism” and William 
Galston’s “political realism” (199).  With possession of something like practical reason, 
Bo Yi, Yi Yin, and Kongzi, as ideal citizens, were able to judge and revise their politi-
cal actions in terms of empirical situations. On the other hand, their political decisions 
must be rooted in both moral and political grounds. “And if any could obtain the world 
by performing one unrighteous deed, or killing one innocent person, he would not 
do it. In these things they are the same” (Mengzi, 2A 2.24).  For a modern project of 
reconciling Confucian values and modern democracy, Mencius’s historical notion of 
“Ming Gui Jun Qing” (民贵君轻) might be compatible with Kim’s public reason Confu-
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cianism. As Mengzi says, “The people are the most important, the altars to the land and 
grain are next, and the ruler is the least important” (7B14.1-14.2). Here, when the will 
of the people and the will of the ruler are not congruent, the will of the people should 
be more fundamental. However, for the question of to what extent,  a right to politi-
cal participation could be entailed from Confucian sagehood, we still need to be more 
cautious about the inference. As Stephen Angle lists in his Contemporary Confucian 
Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism, there have been various textual 
interpretations of the term Min prescribing the ethical progress of a people, while the 
highest stage is identical with Ren. Complex interpretations of the term min supple-
mented with the Mencian analogical reasoning might suggest a loose conclusion of 
political rights and flexible implications of practical judgements rather than a merely 
top-down constitutional order or a universal requirement. Correspondingly, the inter-
twined but also puzzling connection between Confucian values and East Asian eco-
nomic development, and a wide variety of memberships and associations not limited in 
a political community, would suggest something beyond a merely vertical dimension of 
constitutional-democracy. However, Kim’s book is invaluable in integrating classic Chi-
nese philosophy, practical politics, and modern democracy together with sophisticated 
analytic arguments rooted in the contemporary background. Regarding current threats 
to global liberal democracies, it is particularly worthwhile to pursue a project like Kim’s 
work, which shed a light on our ways to conceptualize public reason and democratic 
citizenship beyond liberal neutrality. 
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